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Abstract 
 
Following the government’s decision to place Railtrack into administration (October 
2001), attention has focused on what went wrong with privatisation, and how crucial 
network investment will be financed in future. This paper uses a social cost-benefit 
analysis framework to assess whether the restructuring and privatisation of British Rail 
has produced savings in operating costs. The paper shows that major efficiencies have 
been achieved, consumers have benefited through lower prices, whilst the increased 
government subsidy has been largely recouped through privatisation proceeds. We find 
that output quality has also improved (pre-Hatfield). The achievement of further savings 
will be key to delivering improved rail services in the future. This paper finds that a 
privatised structure, where shareholders demand a return on their investment, has led to 
significant improvements in operating efficiency - it remains to be seen whether the new 
regime, with a not-for-profit infrastructure owner, will deliver the same efficiency 
improvements.  
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I: Introduction 
 
Over the period 1994-1997 the British railway industry was fundamentally transformed. 
In 1994 the industry was in the hands of a single, vertically-integrated operator - British 
Rail - owned by the government. By 1997, BR’s activities had been transferred to the 
private sector. In the process, the industry was restructured into more than one hundred 
companies, thereby removing much of the vertical and horizontal integration of the pre-
privatisation structure.  
Since its reoganisation, and subsequent transfer to the private sector, the rail 
industry's outputs have grown sharply. Between 1992/93 (the last year before 
restructuring began1) and 1999/00, passenger miles and freight tonne-miles grew by 21% 
and 19% respectively, whilst train miles were also up significantly (passenger train miles 
grew by 13% over the period). During this same period, total industry costs2 fell by 
nearly 6%, suggesting that significant efficiency improvements have been made. 
However, the privatisation of British Rail has been the subject of much criticism in 
recent years, particularly in the aftermath of the Hatfield disaster. In October 2001 the 
                                                 
* Pollitt and Smith are both at the Judge Institute of Management Studies, University of 
Cambridge. Smith is funded by the Railtrack Studentship in Rail Regulation. The authors wish to 
thank Luisa Affuso for kindly sharing data with us (data which was generated during a rail 
research project sponsored by the ESRC – grant number: R000237928). The authors also 
acknowledge comments from David Newbery, Luisa Affuso and Stephen Gibson. Usual caveats 
apply.  
 
1 See Section III.2 (a). 
2 Operating costs (excluding depreciation). 
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Government announced that it had decided to put Railtrack into administration – with the 
company to be replaced by a not-for-profit company, limited by guarantee. Railtrack’s 
finances had been crippled by the cost of Hatfield, and cost over-runs on the West Coast 
Main Line project.  
In the aftermath of the government’s announcement, attention has focused on what 
went wrong with privatisation, and how crucial investment for maintenance and 
development of the network will be financed in future. This paper looks at whether the 
restructuring and privatisation of British Rail has produced savings in operating costs, 
relative to the counterfactual scenario of continued public ownership. Operating costs 
include train operator costs (train crews; traction costs; maintenance and cleaning of 
rolling stock), the cost of operating the rail network (including signal operators), and day-
to-day track maintenance and inspections. The analysis excludes all capital (or 
depreciation) costs, and therefore excludes the cost of track (and other infrastructure) 
repairs and renewals, and the capital cost of rolling stock.  
The paper uses the technique of social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) – as developed 
by Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990) – to evaluate the operating efficiency gains (or 
losses) resulting from privatisation, and also considers the allocation of these gains (or 
losses) between consumers, producers and government. The analysis assumes the growth 
in outputs achieved in recent years to be exogenous, and therefore focuses on the cost of 
delivering these outputs under the alternative scenarios of private and public ownership. 
The paper also looks at the changes in output quality (performance; overcrowding; asset 
condition; safety) since privatisation.  
The analysis uses data for the period to 1999/00 (financial year) only, and therefore 
does not take account of the effects of Hatfield. The next financial year (2000/01), which 
includes the Hatfield disaster, is not representative of the period since privatisation as a 
whole (and not all of the financial data are available in any case). Indeed, the effects of 
Hatfield continued into the financial year 2001/02. The analysis should be updated once 
data become fully available for three further years (2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03).  
It should be noted that the change in industry structure means that it is not 
straightforward to compare railway costs before and after privatisation. Our analysis 
makes a number of adjustments to the data to ensure comparability. Inevitably a number 
of assumptions have also been made. These adjustments and assumptions are explained 
in the relevant section of the paper (and also in the appendices).   
The SCBA methodology has previously been applied to a number of privatised 
industries in the UK, for example, electricity (Domah and Pollitt, 2001), and some of the 
earlier sell-offs (Galal et al, 1994; Martin and Parker, 1997). The paper is arranged into 
five sections. Section II briefly outlines the historical background. Section III summarises 
the theoretical arguments for liberalisation (restructuring and privatisation), and sets out 
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the SCBA methodology and data used. Section IV shows the results of the analysis, and 
Section V offers some conclusions. 
 
II. Historical background 
 
The railway network in Britain was planned, financed and built by the private sector in 
the 19th Century. The industry was nationalised in 1948, and then returned to private 
ownership during the period 1995-1997, as part of the wider programme of sell-offs 
carried out by four successive Conservative administrations (1979-1997).  
Since nationalisation, rail traffic has been in almost continual decline in the face of 
increased competition from road transport (see Figures 1A and 1B). In the early 1950s, 
passenger rail travel accounted for roughly 17% of total passenger traffic - by the mid-
1990s this share had fallen to around 5%. Rail freight business saw an even sharper loss 
of market share, from over 40% to just 7% over the same period, driven by the loss of 
traffic to roads, and the decline of Britain’s heavy manufacturing and primary industries 
(which rail freight was particularly well placed to serve). Rail volumes also fell in 
absolute terms up until the mid 1990s. As noted in the introduction, these trends have 
been reversed since privatisation3. 
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3 The upturn in the rail volumes began in 1995/96, one year before the industry had been fully privatised. 
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FIGURE 1B
Passenger Travel by Transport Mode (log)
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Sources: Transport Trends, 2001 Edition (DTLR). 
 
 
The railways moved into a loss-making position in the mid-1950s and, in spite of the 
line and station closures implemented following the Beeching reports (1963; 1965) - 
which saw the total route mileage reduced by a third - the industry’s financial position 
continued to deteriorate during the 1970s and early 1980s (as productivity growth slowed 
whilst wages were on the increase; and as government controls prevented the 
development of commercial pricing). The 1968 Transport Act explicitly recognised the 
need for government subsidy to support loss-making (but socially-beneficial) services. 
However, in line with worsening performance, the level of subsidy also increased over 
time, reaching £1.6bn by 1985/86, compared to £600m in 1968 (1999/00 prices). 
During the 1980s it was recognised that the financial position of the industry, and the 
requirement for government support, would complicate any attempt at privatising the 
industry. Rail privatisation would require route closures and/or continued government 
subsidy after sale. As a result, proposals for rail privatisation developed slowly during the 
1980s, finally culminating in the sale of the industry during the period 1995-1997. 
However, the government (and BR), were not idle in the meantime, and began selling off 
many of BR’s non-core operations (see Table 1). Some of these sales raised substantial 
sums (for example, BR Hotels raised £150m in 1999/00 prices)4. 
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4 Source: Public Enterprise Partnerships Team, HM Treasury. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
BR Non-core Businesses Sold to the Private Sector (1981-1993)  
BR Hovercraft (1981) Doncaster Wagon Works (1987) 
BR Hotels (1982-1984) Horwich Foundry (1988) 
Superbreak Mini Holidays (1983) British Rail Engineering Ltd (1988) 
Slateford Laundry (1983) Travellers Fare [station catering] 
(1988) 
Sealink UK (1984) Transmark [consultancy] (1993) 
British Transport Advertising (1987) Meldon Quarry (1993) 
Sources: Bradshaw and Lawton-Smith (p 104) and Freeman & Shaw (page 9). 
 
The debate on privatising the core railway operations continued throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s. In 1992, immediately following the surprise Conservative election 
victory, a White Paper, ‘New Opportunities for the Railways’ (Department of Transport), 
was quickly put together under the direction of the John MacGregor (then Secretary of 
State for Transport). The strong likelihood that the Conservatives would lose the 
subsequent election (1997) injected an urgency into the process, as the government 
sought to complete the sale of the industry in one Parliament – and thus make 
privatisation effectively irreversible.  
The 1992 White Paper outlined the government’s privatisation objectives, which were 
similar to those for previous sell-offs: to harness the skills of private sector management, 
in order to achieve greater responsiveness to customer needs, higher service quality, 
improved efficiency and better value for money. The introduction of competition was 
thought to be the best way of achieving these objectives (following the example of the 
electricity restructuring in 1990), although it was recognised that regulation would be 
required to protect consumers (especially with regard to safety). 
As a result, the industry was separated (vertically and horizontally) into more than 
one hundred companies (see Figure 2 below), to allow competition to develop in the 
contestable elements of the business. The restructuring was carried out initially within the 
public sector, creating shadow companies, which were later sold. 
The most significant change was the separation of control of the track infrastructure 
(natural monopoly) from train operation (contestable). In 1994, most of the fixed railway 
infrastructure assets were transferred to a new company, Railtrack, separate from BR, but 
still wholly-owned by Government. The company was sold by public offer in 19965.  
At the same time, BR’s infrastructure services were reorganised into seven 
infrastructure maintenance and six track renewal companies (sold between February and 
July 1996). BR’s rolling stock was divided into three leasing companies (ROSCOs). The 
ROSCOs (sold in January/February 1996) lease locomotives and carriages to the 
                                                 
5 See Kain (1998) page 248; NAO Report (HC 25 Session 1998-99) page 20. 
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passenger train operating companies6. Six heavy maintenance depots (provide services to 
ROSCOs) were also sold in April and June 19957.  
The right to run passenger train services was franchised to 25 private sector train 
operating companies (TOCs) - with open-access competition to be introduced gradually 
under the “moderation of competition” rules laid down by the Regulator (from 1995 
onwards). TOCs lease almost all of their rolling stock from the ROSCOs, and pay 
Railtrack for access to track and stations. Red Star Parcels was sold to a management 
buy-out in September 19958.  
 
FIGURE 2 
The New Rail Industry in 1996/97 
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Freight operations were separated into six companies (later consolidated into two) 
and sold between December 1995 and November 1997 (with open-access competition 
                                                 
6 See NAO (HC 576 Session 1997-98) p 1. 
7 See NAO (HC 25 Session 1998-99) page 22. 
8 Provides rapid parcels distribution on passenger trains - see, Department of Transport, ‘New 
Opportunities for the Railways’ page 12; British Railway Board Accounts 1995/96. 
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allowed from the outset). In addition, many other BR central services operations were 
sold to private sector companies or management teams9.  
As part of the reorganisation, two regulatory bodies were also created: (1) The Office 
of Rail Regulator (ORR), principally to regulate the monopoly element of the business - 
Railtrack; and (2) The Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), mainly 
responsible for awarding franchises, paying subsidies, and regulating the TOCs10. Rail 
Users’ Consultative Committees (RUCCs) were established to work with OPRAF in 
protecting the interests of rail users11. Safety regulation was placed with the Health & 
Safety Executive.  
Having described the background to rail privatisation, the remainder of the paper 
concentrates on whether the new structure has met one of the government’s main 
objectives – namely, improving operating efficiency - and how any efficiency gains (or 
losses) have been allocated between consumers, producers and government. 
Since privatisation industry outputs have increased substantially (reversing a long-
term trend of decline), whilst costs have fallen in real terms. The new structure gave the 
TOCs strong incentives to increase outputs and reduce costs (because of declining 
subsidies; fixed access charges). Whilst part of the output growth since the mid 1990s can 
be attributed to privatisation itself - through, for example, fare regulation and better 
marketing) - in the subsequent analysis (Section IV) we make the conservative 
assumption that output growth has been driven entirely by exogenous factors (eg. GDP 
growth; road congestion). This assumption reduces the benefits attributed to privatisation 
in our analysis.  
Our analysis therefore focuses on whether the industry’s outputs – driven by 
exogenous factors - would have been delivered more cheaply under the new structure 
than under continued public ownership. Data on output quality (performance; 
overcrowding; asset condition; safety) are also evaluated. The new structure contained a 
number of features to ensure that efficiency gains would be shared with consumers (fare 
regulation; competition) and government (declining subsidy profile). The analysis in 
Section IV quantifies the allocation of efficiency gains (or losses) between the different 
groups.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Kain (1998), page 250; Bradshaw and Lawton-Smith (2000), pages 108; 118; NAO Report ‘The Sale 
of Railfreight Distribution’. 
10 John Swift (QC) and Roger Salmon were appointed as the first Rail Regulator and Franchising Director 
respectively (January 1993) - see Freeman & Shaw (2000), page 207. 
11 See Freeman & Shaw (2000), p 33. 
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III. Methodology 
 
1. Theoretical issues and empirical work 
 
The ideological belief underlying the privatisation of British Rail was that the injection of 
private sector expertise and flair would result in improved services, more efficient 
operations, and better value for money for the traveling public. It was also hoped that the 
private sector would be able to lure passengers and freight customers back to the railways 
(greater responsiveness to customer needs), and arrest the long-term decline of the 
industry. 
However, following earlier privatisations (eg. BT and British Gas), it was recognised 
that change in ownership alone would be insufficient to deliver the required 
improvements in services and cost. Whilst private ownership and the profit motive 
provide better incentives than public ownership, the government saw competition, and 
the ending of BR’s monopoly, as key to delivering improvements on the railways.  
The liberalisation of public enterprises in general often involves three separate, and 
not necessarily connected elements: changes in ownership; the creation of new, or 
radically restructured companies; and the introduction of some degree of competition. 
Depending on the combination of these factors, liberalisation will tend to cause 
significant changes in the way businesses are conducted. Pollitt (1997) identifies five 
theoretical arguments relating to the likely efficiency effects of liberalisation: 
 
1. liberalisation can improve incentives by reallocating property rights from the public 
to the private sector; 
 
2. liberalisation may change the objective functions of managers being faced with 
private sector incentives for the first time; 
 
3. there may be incentives for distortionary resource allocation, caused by some types of 
regulation (eg. rate of return regulation) leading to inefficiency; 
 
4. liberalisation may cause “influence activities” within the industry (eg. empire 
building), which may result in a divergence from efficiency; and 
 
5. policy commitment theories suggest that liberalisation will result in lower 
intervention costs. 
 
Pollitt (1997) notes that, in a developed, market economy such as the UK, the 
theoretical predictions provide some (weak) support for restructuring and privatisation in 
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the case of property rights, bureaucracy and commitment theories; but that poorly 
constructed incentive regulation could negate all the other positive benefits from 
liberalisation. As a result, the impact of any particular restructuring and privatisation 
process (in a given industry or country) has the potential to be highly variable. 
A number of methodologies have been used to assess the impact of liberalisation, for 
example based on price or cost comparisons, as used by Yarrow (1992) and Bishop and 
Thompson (1992), or using simulation or frontier approaches, such as Burns and 
Weyman-Jones (1994). These methodologies have been criticised as they do not directly 
address the issue of whether it is likely to be socially beneficial (in particular they do not 
address the distributional effects of liberalisation).  
A more comprehensive approach would be the computational general equilibrium 
(CGE) method (for example, Chisari, Estache and Romero,1999), which assess the 
macroeconomic and distributional effects of privatisation and regulation. However, none 
of these approaches possess the power of an overall social cost-benefit analysis (outlined 
below), and are themselves based on numerous assumptions regarding specification of 
objectives and constraints. 
SCBA studies, for example Galal et al (1994) and others (Newberry and Pollitt, 1997) 
have addressed the failures of the other methodologies. In this paper we use a SCBA 
framework to analyse the effect of liberalising Britain’s railway industry. 
 
2. The Social Cost-Benefit Methodology 
 
The methodology developed by Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang is concerned first with 
assessing the total change in welfare resulting from privatisation and restructuring, and 
second with the allocation of this change, principally between three groups, consumers, 
producers (ie shareholders of the new, privatised companies), and government12. The first 
question relates to the productive efficiency impact (net of restructuring costs) of 
liberalisation, whilst the latter is concerned with equity. For simplicity our analysis 
ignores changes in allocative efficiency. 
Jones et al define the privatisation decision according to the following formula: 

W = Vsp - Vsg + (g-p)*Z 
 
where: W = Social Welfare; Vsp  = Social value of firm under private operation;  
Vsg = Social value of firm under continued government operation; Z = Price paid to buy 
                                                 
12 Jones et al also consider other parties, such as competitors and suppliers (often excluded from empirical 
applications of the methodology on practical grounds), and workers (often excluded on the grounds that 
any rents earned by employees are fully compensated through redundancy payments, which are included 
within the cost base of the companies concerned). 
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the firm (or government sales proceeds) and g and p are the shadow multipliers on 
government revenue and private funds respectively. 
Privatisation will be socially worthwhile if W>0. In a developed, market economy, 
we would expect no significant difference in the value of shadow multipliers, so for the 
purpose of our analysis we set g=p=1. The sales proceeds variable, Z, which is a 
transfer payment between government and producers, therefore drops out of the equation 
(though remains important for its distributional effects). 
The calculation of W involves computing the difference between the costs under 
public and private ownership (both over the period since privatisation, and into the 
future). Costs under private ownership (to date) are based on actual data; and these also 
need to be projected into the future. However, the main difficulty lies in estimating what 
would have happened to costs under continued public ownership. In order to address this 
issue we need to build a counterfactual scenario based on historic and other economic 
data. 
The efficiency savings due to liberalisation are calculated as the difference between 
the present value of actual (private) and counterfactual (continued public ownership) 
costs. Restructuring costs are then deducted, to arrive at the value of W. The final step is 
to allocate W between the three groups (consumers, producers, and government), and 
therefore to determine the winners and losers (see below).  
 
(a) Comparing Costs with and without Privatisation 
 
The first task is to decide on the cut-off point between public and private ownership. In 
this paper we take 1996/97 as the first full year of privatisation13. However, the last year 
of public ownership is taken to be 1992/93, since this is the last year unaffected by the 
restructuring and privatisation programme14 (see below). The transition period (1993/94 
to 1995/96) saw the restructuring of the industry and its transfer to private ownership.  
The sale of British Rail was accompanied by a radical restructuring of the industry, to 
create more than one hundred new companies. As a result, computing the total (actual) 
rail industry cost since privatisation is not straightforward, given the number of 
companies involved, and the complex set of financial payments flowing between the 
                                                 
13 By 1996/97 the following parts of the industry had been sold: Railtrack (sold in May 1996); the three 
ROSCOs (sold in January/February 1996); thirteen infrastructure companies (sold between February and 
July 1996); six heavy maintenance depots (sold in April and June 1995); Red Star Parcels (sold in 
September 1995); the majority of the freight businesses (sold between December 1995 and May 1996, with 
the exception of Railfreight Distribution, which was not sold until November 1997). By the end of 1996/97, 
all of the 25 franchises had been let.  
 
14 In 1993/94 a voluntary severance offer was announced, in preparation for changes in organisation and 
ownership, which led to over 7000 employees leaving the industry. 
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companies. In addition, care is required in comparing cost data before and after 
privatisation. 
It was not possible to calculate the post-privatisation cost base by adding up the costs 
of the constituent parts (and eliminating inter-company flows), as the data did not permit 
such an analysis. We get around this problem by deriving industry costs as the difference 
between total industry revenue received from final users (train operator revenue), less 
total industry profits. The data are shown in Table 2, for the post-privatisation period 
(1996/97 to 1999/00). The data for earlier years are taken directly from BR Annual 
Reports.  
The costs in Table 2 are operating costs (excluding depreciation). Whilst a full SCBA 
analysis would also include a consideration of the capital costs, this paper focuses only 
on the operating side of the business (and therefore assumes no significant capital 
substitution effects).  
A number of points are worth noting with regard to the data in Table 2. First, it 
excludes the costs of minor (open-access) freight operators (though these are small), thus 
underestimating post-privatisation costs slightly. On the other hand, the profit data in 
Table 2 do not reflect the returns made by the many supplier companies sold as part of 
the restructuring, who now provide services to the industry (therefore overstating the 
post-privatisation costs). ORR costs are charged out to the industry, so do not need to be 
added separately.  
The costs of the Strategic Rail Authority are included in Table 2 (netted off against 
TOC profits) – though to the extent that the SRA, and its predecessor, OPRAF, were 
staffed through transfers from other parts of government, the inclusion of these costs may 
overstate costs under the privatisation scenario, relative to the counterfactual. Indeed, 
Department of Transport costs, which would have been considerably higher under the 
counterfactual, are not included in our analysis.  
Residual BR costs have been excluded (these include policing costs, which are 
charged out to the industry)15. On balance, given the scale of some of the supplier 
contracts - for example, Railtrack spends roughly £1.3bn per year on contracts with 
infrastructure maintenance and renewal companies alone - we expect that the approach 
used overstates the post-privatisation costs overall, and therefore underestimates the 
efficiency gains from privatisation. For further explanation of the costs in Table 2 see 
Appendix A. 
                                                 
15 BR residual costs also include some property costs (non-operational) and costs relating to liabilities 
relating to the pre-privatisation period. Further analysis may look at whether any of these costs should be 
added to the post-privatisation cost base. 
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TABLE 2 
Rail Industry Costs 
 
Rail Industry Costs Pre-privatisation Transitiong Post-privatisation 
£m, 99/00 pricesa 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00
 
Passenger revenueb 
Freight revenuec 
Railtrack prop. Incomed 
Total industry revenue (A) 
 
TOC profits  
Freight profits 
Railtrack profits 
ROSCO profits 
Total profits (B)e 
 
Industry costs (A-B) 4,287 4,195 4,176 4,394 4,406
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,023 NA NA
5,220
607
133
5,960
24
52
1,035
533
1,644
4,316
5,223
573
134
5,930
181
87
1,064
528
1,860
4,070
5,180
555
139
5,874
162
82
1,054
483
1,781
4,093
5,150
601
137
5,888
164
68
1,028
473
1,733
4,155
Passenger train miles (m) 
Freight-tonne miles (bn) 
Composite indexf 
222
11.2
100
225
10.4
99
232
9.9
100
231
9.5
99
228
9.6
98
228 
8.6 
96 
222
8.1
92
231
8.3
96
229
9.4
98
237
10.5
103
249
10.8
108
257
11.4
112
(a) Conversion uses RPI data. (b) Includes subsidies. TOCs only (excludes Heathrow Express and Eurostar). Financial data for 5 TOCs were not available for 
1999/00 – data were extrapolated for these TOCs. (c) Includes EWS and Freightliner16. (d) That part of Railtrack’s income which does not come from TOCs or 
freight operators (needs to be included for comparability with BR data). (e) Profits before depreciation, net of SRA/OPRAF costs. (f) Weighted index used to 
calculate unit costs (88/90 =100). Weighted based on freight/passenger revenue. (g) It was not possible to construct comparable data for 94/95 and 95/96 due to 
restructuring.  
 
Sources: BR Annual Reports; Annual Reports for individual companies (post privatisation). Transport Trends, 2001 Edition (DTLR). 
                                                 
16 Data for Freightliner has been collected for 1998/99 and 1999/00 only – the data for 1996/97 and 1997/98 was extrapolated.  
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For the counterfactual cost scenario, we have relied on historical data from BR’s 
accounts. We started by reviewing the cost data for ten years prior to privatisation 
(1984/85 to 1993/94) – note that privatisation began in 1994/95 (eg. heavy maintenance 
depots were sold, and Railtrack was created as a separate company, within government). 
However, the final period chosen to inform the counterfactual was shortened to the five 
years (1988/89 to 1992/93) for the reasons outlined below. 
1993/94 was excluded from the pre-privatisation period – this year was significantly 
affected by the privatisation and restructuring programme, and saw a voluntary severance 
programme, in preparation for privatisation, which led to a 7% reduction in headcount in 
that year17. The data from 1984/85 to 1987/88 have also been excluded from the analysis. 
1984/85 and 1985/86 was affected by the coal strike (see BR Annual Report, 1985/86).  
The data between 1986/87 and 1988/89 were impacted by the sale of a number of 
businesses, continuing a trend which started in the early 1980s (see Table 1). In 
particular, BR sold British Rail Engineering Ltd (BREL) and Travellers Fare (station 
catering). Whilst it is not possible to calculate the exact impact of these sales on BR’s 
cost base, the sales of the two businesses led to a reduction in headcount by around 
13,000 (or 8%) between 1987/88 and 1988/89.  
Having established the appropriate time period for historical analysis, the 
counterfactual cost profile is then constructed based on the 1992/93 cost level, projected 
forward using an assumption about counterfactual efficiency gains (based on historical 
performance, and data from other industries). The construction of the counterfactual cost 
scenario is described in detail in Section IV.1.  
The calculation of a counterfactual cost profile, based on historic data, raises the 
question of whether the pre and post-privatisation cost data are comparable. The 
formation of Railtrack in 1994/95 saw a change in accounting policy through the 
introduction of the Asset Maintenance Plan Charge (AMP). This approach forecasts the 
required repairs and renewal activity for track, route structures, stations and depots over a 
ten year period, and charges one tenth of this estimate to the P&L in each year (as 
depreciation18).  
However, we are satisfied that the data (pre and post privatisation) remain 
comparable, despite the change in policy. The main impact of the change was to 
significantly increase overall costs (to address under-investment before privatisation, 
resulting from cash constraints), but this increase was reflected in a higher depreciation 
charge (which is excluded from operating costs in our analysis – see Appendix B). There 
is no evidence to suggest that the change resulted in any transfer of cost between 
operating costs and capex: the level of day-to-day infrastructure maintenance (the 
                                                 
17 1993/94 also saw a number of minor sell-offs (Transmark and Meldon Quarry). 
18 From 1998/99 onwards the AMP charge formally became part of depreciation under FRS 15. 
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operating element of maintenance costs) increased in 1994/95, compared with the 
previous year19.  
To complete the analysis, the SCBA approach requires projections of both the actual 
(privatised) and counterfactual (public ownership) costs into the future. For simplicity, 
we have assumed that no further savings are made after 1999/00, and that the efficiency 
gap opened up by the private sector is closed over the following fifteen years (that is, the 
public sector is assumed to catch up over time).  
 
(b) The Efficiency Gains from Restructuring and Privatisation 
 
The value of efficiency gains from privatisation and restructuring are simply calculated as  
the difference between the present value of the two cost profiles Cg-Cp less the present 
value of restructuring and privatisation costs (R&P). 
 
W= Cg-Cp – R&P 
 
Restructuring and privatisation costs are assumed to be zero under the counterfactual 
scenario. Under the privatisation scenario they include all R&P costs incurred within 
government (in 1993/94, 1994/95 and 1995/96), and all restructuring costs incurred since 
privatisation (1996/97 onwards, by the newly-privatised companies). 
 
(c) Distribution of the Net Efficiency Gains 
   
Once the present value of the net efficiency gains from privatisation has been calculated, 
the next step is to analyse its distribution between consumers, producers and government, 
as summarised in the following identity: 
 
W= Cust + Prod + Gov 
 
Cust is calculated as the difference between actual and counterfactual average 
revenue (price), multiplied by the actual volume. The price was computed using a 
composite volume index based on passenger miles and freight tonne-miles (weighted 
according to passenger and freight revenue). The counterfactual average revenue (price) 
projection was estimated by extrapolating the trend in average revenue for the five years 
prior to privatisation20.  
The change in the government’s position (Gov) is relatively complex, and includes a 
number of factors. First of all, by selling the industry the government foregoes any 
                                                 
19 This is a key assumption, which could change the results significantly. 
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potential profit/(deficit) streams from the business in future, and in return receives the 
sales proceeds for the industry and a share of future profitability through corporation tax. 
In contrast to earlier privatisations, the government has also continued to provide ongoing 
revenue subsidies21 to the sector since privatisation. The counterfactual scenario assumes 
that the government would continue to pay revenue subsidies to cover operating losses. 
However, there is a further complication here. On privatisation, the government was 
relieved (to some extent22) of its responsibility to provide funding for capital investment 
(which averaged £1.1bn per annum in 1999/00 prices during the five years prior to 
privatisation). Whilst the analysis in this paper focuses on operating costs (and ignores 
capital costs), it is necessary to reflect the saved capital costs in the calculation of the 
government’s welfare position. The average of £1.1bn per annum is used in the 
counterfactual to reflect this, and the same figure is used (with a negative sign) to reflect 
the capital costs which the private sector would need to cover out of operating profits23.  
 
Gov is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
Gov  = Privatisation Scenario (Taxes – Subsidy + Sales Proceeds)  
 
– Counterfactual Scenario (Operating profits/losses + Capital Subsidies) 
 
For producers, there is no counterfactual (since the counterfactual assumes public 
ownership). Prod is simply calculated as the post-tax profits under the privatisation 
scenario, less the amount paid to purchase the business (the corollary of government sales 
proceeds), less an amount to reflect capital expenditure (the corollary of the £1.1bn saved 
capital cost used to calculate Gov).  
With regard to future projections – that is, beyond 1999/00 - it is assumed that the 
privatisation scenario variables remain at their 1999/00 levels24, whilst the counterfactual 
cost and fares gradually fall until they are in line with the privatisation scenario. To 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 For simplicity we are ignoring the allocative efficiency aspect of any price changes. 
21 In the analysis in Section IV, subsidies are taken to include both Central Government subsidies (paid 
through OPRAF), and PTE grants. 
22 Note that the Periodic Review (2000) allowed for significant grant payments direct to Railtrack (from 
2001/02), to cover the exceptional level of renewal expenditure required over the next control period. 
However, grants to Railtrack in the years since privatisation (1996/97 to 1999/00) have been relatively 
small, and are not reflected in the allocation of efficiency gains between government and producers 
(however, grant income is taken account of in arriving at operating costs – see Appendix A). 
23 Thus implicitly assuming no savings on investment costs from privatisation. 
24 This means that the actual government subsidy and the saved capital cost is assumed to remain at its 
1999/00 level. Of course, existing franchise agreements build in further subsidy reductions, though it is not 
clear that these are sustainable. In addition, the debate over the levels of capital expenditure required, and 
particularly who will fund it, is ongoing. 
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complete the above calculations, restructuring costs are subtracted from Gov and Prod, 
depending on when the costs were incurred (ie before or after privatisation).  
 
IV. Results 
 
1. Cost changes 
 
Figure 3 shows the profile of total rail industry costs (actual) over the period 1988/89 to 
1999/00. The data show that total costs were rising in the period up until 1992/93, fell 
sharply in 1993/94, as the restructuring of the industry began, and then remained broadly 
static in real terms between 1993/94 and 1999/00, whilst industry outputs grew strongly. 
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FIGURE 3
Rail Industry Total Costs 1988/89 to 1999/00
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In order to understand what has been happening to unit costs over the period, we first 
need to decide on an appropriate measure of output. The next step is to separate out the 
impact of scale effects from underlying efficiency improvements. This second step 
requires an assumption about the proportions of fixed and variable costs in the rail 
industry. 
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Our measure of output (see Table 2 above), is a composite index based on passenger 
train miles and freight tonne-miles, weighted according to the split between passenger 
and freight revenues. With respect to fixed and variable costs we make the following 
assumptions: 
 
1. based on work carried out during the 2000 Periodic Review of Railtrack’s access 
charges, we assume that 17%25 of infrastructure costs are variable with respect to 
volume (or 83% of costs are fixed). In our analysis, infrastructure costs make up 36% 
of the total cost base; 
 
2. for the remainder of the cost base we assume that costs exhibit broadly constant 
returns to scale (we assume that 10% of these remaining costs are fixed). 
 
Overall, our assumptions on scale mean that around 37% of the cost base is fixed with 
respect to volume26. Of course there will be other fixed costs, including infrastructure 
renewal and rolling stock depreciation costs, but these are excluded, as our analysis 
focuses on operating expenditure, and excludes capital (or depreciation) costs. The 
variable cost element is assumed to vary in line with our volume index, which is based on 
passenger train miles and freight tonne-miles.  
It is important to note that passenger miles are not included in our measure of volume. 
This is a conservative assumption which reduces the level of efficiency gains attributed to 
privatisation in our calculations. Passenger miles have grown much faster than passenger 
train miles in recent years (21%, compared to only 13% since 1992/93). We note, 
however, that whilst train miles are likely to be the main driver of costs, some costs will 
increase in line with passenger miles (for example, an increased number of coaches have 
been employed since privatisation to accommodate higher passenger numbers; station 
and revenue-protection costs are also likely to vary with passenger miles).  
Now that we have made our choice of volume measure and assumption about returns 
to scale, we are in a position to analyse the trends in unit costs (before and after 
privatisation), and to separate out the scale effects from underlying efficiency gains. 
Table 3 presents total and unit costs for the pre-privatisation period (1988/89 to 1992/93), 
splitting out the impact of scale effects from efficiency improvements. 
Table 3 shows that scale effects would have caused unit costs to rise by 0.2% per 
annum over the five years 1988/89 to 1992/93 (falling volumes, with 37% of cost base 
                                                 
25 The Periodic Review analysis found that 17% of maintenance and renewal cost was usage-driven. Since 
our analysis includes only maintenance costs, we have assumed that 17% of maintenance costs are variable. 
In addition, traction costs are also assumed to be variable, which (coincidentally) produces a figure of 17% 
variable costs overall. 
26 This assumption is in line with other studies of the rail industry. See Estache and Rus (2000), page 208. 
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fixed). However, actual unit costs rose by 1.2% per annum, implying negative 
efficiencies, or an efficiency loss of 1% per annum over the period. However, in our 
central counterfactual scenario we assume that BR would have delivered efficiency gains 
of 1% per annum over the period 1992/93 to 1999/00. This assumption, which weighs in 
favour of public ownership, recognises some of the difficulties of comparing BR costs 
over the pre-privatisation period (changes in accounting policy27), and also reflects the 
experience of other regulated companies in the UK28.  
 
TABLE 3 
Pre-Privatisation Costs 
 
Pre-privatisation costs – 1999/00 £m 
 
88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93  Annual 
Change  
Scale effects (no efficiencies) 
Fixed costs 
Variable costs 
Total costs 
 
1,566
2,721
4,287
1,566
2,693
4,259
1,566
2,721
4,287
 
1,566 
2,691 
4,257 
 
 
1,566
2,672
4,238
0%
(0.5%)
(0.3%)
Actual costs 
Total costs 
 
4,287 4,195 4,176
 
4,394 4,406 0.7%
Efficiency analysis 
Composite volume index 
Unit costsa – after scale effects 
Unit costs – actual 
Underlying efficiency gain/(loss) 
100
42.9
42.9
99
43.0
42.4
 
100
42.9
41.8
 
 
99 
43.0 
44.4 
98
43.2
44.9
(0.5%)
0.2%
1.2%
(1.0%)
(a) Unit costs calculated by dividing total costs by the volume index.  
 
 
Table 4 (below) shows actual and counterfactual costs (central scenario) for the post-
privatisation period. The first section of the table shows the impact of scale effects on 
unit costs, given our assumptions about fixed and variable costs. The data show that total 
costs (after scale effects) are assumed to increase by 1.2% per annum, whilst the volume 
                                                 
27 We note that BR made a significant change to its accounting policy in 1991/92, which meant that 
infrastructure costs were capitalised for the first time. Since BR produced data for 1991/92 on both 
accounting bases, we have been able to construct a consistent time series for the period 1988/89 to 1992/93. 
However, the lumpy nature of infrastructure spending may cause problems of comparability of individual 
years during the period before 1991/92 (though note that major upgrade expenditure was capitalised across 
the whole period). 
28 Domah and Pollitt (2001), page 126 – a 1% annual efficiency improvement is considered a reasonable 
assumption of the likely sustainable improvement for the electricity industry. See also, Europe Economics 
(2000), page 18 – this report quotes a study by Bishop and Thomson (1992), which shows TFP growth in 
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index grows by 1.9% p.a. over the same period, thus implying an elasticity of costs with 
respect to volume of 0.63. 
The second section of the table shows the actual trend in total and unit costs since 
privatisation – unit costs have fallen by 2.7% per annum over the period, of which 0.7% 
is due to scale effects, and 2.0% to underlying efficiency improvements. Finally, the third 
section of Table 4 shows counterfactual costs under the central scenario. This series is 
calculated by applying an efficiency saving of 1% per annum to total costs after scale 
effects in section 1 of the table. Under the counterfactual scenario, unit costs fall by 1.7% 
per annum, of which 1% per annum results from underlying efficiency savings, and the 
balance from scale effects (0.7%). 
 
TABLE 4 
Post-Privatistion Costs 
 
Post-privatisation costs – 
1999/00 £m 
92/93 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 Annual
Change
Scale effects (no efficiencies) 
Fixed costsa 
Variable costs 
Total costs 
Volume index 
Unit costsb 
 
1,610
2,796
4,406
98
44.9
1,610
2,784
4,394
98
44.9
1,610
2,938
4,548
103
44.1
1,610
3,073
4,683
108
43.4
 
1,610 
3,190 
4,800 
112 
42.9 
0%
1.9%
1.2%
1.9%
(0.7%)
Actual costs 
Total costs 
Unit costs 
Underlying efficiency 
4,406
44.9
4316
44.1
4070
39.4
4093
37.9
 
4155 
37.1 
(0.8%)
(2.7%)
2.0%
Counterfactual costs 
Total costs 
Unit costs 
Underlying efficiency gain/(loss) 
 
4,407
44.9
4,222
43.2
4,325
41.9
4,409
40.9
 
4,474 
39.9 
0.2%
(1.7%)
1.0%
(a) Fixed and variable costs recalculated in 1992/93.  
(b) Unit costs calculated by dividing total costs by the volume index. 
 
 
Figure 4 below shows actual costs, and the profile of counterfactual costs under three 
scenarios: pro-privatisation scenario (underlying efficiency gain of 0% per annum); 
central scenario (underlying efficiency gain of 1% p.a., described above); and pro-public 
scenario (underlying efficiency gain of 2% p.a.).  
                                                                                                                                                 
the rail industry to be 1.2% per annum during the 1980s (note, however, that TFP analyses need to be 
treated with care). 
 19
As noted in Section III.2, it is assumed that the efficiency gap opened up by the 
private sector is gradually closed over the next 15 years (post 1999/00) – that is, the 
public sector is assumed to catch up. This assumption therefore weighs heavily in support 
of continued public ownership, and against privatisation.  
 
 
FIGURE 4
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2. Calculation of efficiency gains 
 
Table 5 provides estimates of the discounted efficiency gains (pre-restructuring) resulting 
from rail privatisation in the UK. Estimates are shown for the three alternative 
assumptions about underlying efficiency improvements under the counterfactual scenario 
(0%, 1% and 2%). In addition, the results are also shown for two different discount rates, 
6% (used by government) and 10% (private sector discount rate). 
With a 6% discount rate, the central scenario shows the total discounted efficiency 
gains to be £2.5bn. This efficiency gain is partly offset by restructuring costs of £1.4bn 
(see Table 6), yielding efficiency gains net of restructuring costs of £1.1bn. 
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TABLE 5 
Gross Efficiency Savings (Pre-Restructuring) 
 
Counterfactual  
unit cost reduction 
Discount rate 
 6% 10% 
0% £5,200m £4,800m 
   
1% £2,500m £2,200m 
   
2% (£100m) (£200m) 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Restructuring Costs 
 
Restructuring costs  
(present value) 
93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00
Government 427 415 239  
Private sector 176 63 33 98
Total 427 415 239 176 63 33 98
Sources: British Rail Annual Reports; Annual Reports for privatised companies 
(Railtrack; 25 TOCs; 3 ROSCOs; EWS). 
 
 
Table 7 (below) shows the profiling of the discounted savings between the period to 
date (1996/97 to 1999/00) and the future (the savings gap achieved to date is assumed to 
be closed over the next 15 years). The units of the data in Table 7 are £million 
(discounted). 
Under the Central Scenario (6% discount rate), the data show that privatisation has 
already yielded £800m in efficiency savings, although these savings have been more than 
offset by restructuring costs (£1,400m). This position is unsurprising, as the industry has 
only been in private hands for four years, and we would expect the cost of restructuring to 
be recovered over a longer period. Total savings (including future savings29) under the 
Central Scenario amount to £1,100m (£500m at a 10% discount rate) after restructuring 
costs. 
The data in Table 7 are sensitive to the cost assumption under the counterfactual 
scenario. The savings estimates are much higher if we assume that underlying unit costs 
                                                 
29 Note that, as described earlier, the future savings do not reflect additional savings – rather they are based 
on the continuation of the savings gap in 1999/00 into future years (though declining each year as the 
public sector is assumed to catch up). 
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would have remained flat under public ownership (pro-privatisation scenario); on the 
other hand, under a counterfactual cost assumption of 2% (pro-public scenario), the 
savings become approximately zero (before restructuring costs)30. However, given the 
fact that unit costs increased during the pre-privatisation period (by more than would 
have been expected due to scale effects alone – see Table 3), it is difficult to argue for a 
counterfactual cost reduction that is more aggressive than assumed in the central scenario.  
 
TABLE 7 
Profiling of Efficiency Savings 
 
 Discount rate 
 6% 10% 
 To 
date 
Fut. Total To date Fut. Total 
Pro-privatisation 
scenario 
      
Efficiency gains 1,900 3,300 5,200 2,000 2,800 4,800 
Restructuring costs (1,400) - (1,400) (1,700) - (1,700) 
Net efficiency gain/(loss) 500 - 3,800 300 - 3,100 
Central scenario       
Efficiency gains 800 1,700 2,500 800 1,400 2,200 
Restructuring costs (1,400) - (1,400) (1700) - (1700) 
Net efficiency gain/(loss) (600) - 1,100 (900) - 500 
Pro-public scenario       
Efficiency gains (200) 100 (100) (200) 0 (200) 
Restructuring costs (1,400) - (1,400) (1,700) - (1,700) 
Net efficiency gain/(loss) (1,600) - (1,500) (1,900) - (1,900) 
 
 
It is important to note that this paper does not seek to explain the improvements in 
efficiency. Freeman & Shaw (2000)31 provide some anecdotal evidence on efficiency 
improvements achieved by the TOCs (through staff reductions). In addition, during the 
2000 Periodic Review Railtrack reported significant efficiency savings since privatisation 
(2.2% per annum between 1994/95 and 1999/00)32. However, we note that a survey of 
rail transport efficiency carried out by Oum, Waters II and Chunyan (1999) found that 
                                                 
30 Note that it is assumed that the public sector (counterfactual) cost profile catches up with the privatisation 
scenario over time, but that no restructuring costs are required to achieve this catch up. In practice, 
restructuring costs would also be required under public ownership. 
31 Op. cit. (Chapter 7). 
32 See Office of the Rail Regulator (December 1999). 
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increased competition (driven by liberalisation and deregulation) led to improved 
efficiency in almost all of the papers reviewed33. 
 
3. Allocation of efficiency savings 
 
Table 8 shows the allocation of the efficiency gains/(losses) between producers, 
government and consumers. Gov/(Prod) include the privatisation proceeds 
/(payments). The subsidy data used in the analysis include both OPRAF subsidies and 
PTE grants. The units of the data in Table 8 are £million (discounted). 
 
TABLE 8 
Allocation of Efficiency Savings 
 
 Discount rate 
 6% 10% 
 Pro-privatisation scenario (cost fall of 0% pa) 
Gov  2,400 3,900 
Prod 34 200 (2,000) 
Cust  1,200 1,200 
W 3,800 3,100 
 Central scenario (cost fall of 1% pa) 
Gov  (300) 1,300 
Prod 200 (2,000) 
Cust  1,200 1,200 
W 1,100 500 
 Pro-public scenario (cost fall of 2% pa) 
Gov  (2,900) (1,100) 
Prod 200 (2,000) 
Cust  1,200 1,200 
W (1,500) (1,900) 
 
                                                 
33 We note that in the case of Britain’s railways, competition between passenger train operators has been 
limited mainly to overlapping franchises and duplicate routes. However, the franchise process resulted in 
significant competition for franchises (competition for the market). In addition, some competition has 
developed in the freight business. Other elements of the value chain have also been subject to competition 
(at least in theory), for example, infrastructure maintenance companies, and ROSCOs. 
34 Note that changes in the counterfactual cost assumption only affect the payout to government: a better 
counterfactual cost performance means that the government would have had to provide lower support to the 
industry under public ownership, which means that its gains are lower the higher the counterfactual cost 
reduction. Consumer benefits (based on prices) and producer gains (based on actual, not counterfactual 
performance) are unaffected by changes in the counterfactual cost assumption 
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The key result from Table 8 is that the consumer benefits from privatisation to the 
tune of £1.2bn. Average revenue (passenger and freight revenue divided by a composite 
volume index based on passenger miles and freight tonne-miles) was lower in real terms 
in every year since privatisation than before the sell-off (see Figure 5 below). This gain 
has been secured, in part, by the arrangements put in place to constrain price increases on 
regulated fares below the rate of inflation. Before privatisation, prices were often 
increased in real terms to choke off demand (the counterfactual assumes that this policy 
would have been continued). 
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* Weighted index based on passenger miles and freight tonne-miles. 
 
Overall, under the Central Scenario, consumers gain slightly more than the level of 
savings, leaving producers and government together with a loss of £100m. The split 
between government and producers takes accounts of the privatisation sales proceeds 
(£7bn in present value terms – see Table 9 below). However, the split between the two 
groups is also highly sensitive to the assumption made about the government’s savings 
through reduced capital investment (and correspondingly the level of private capital 
investment), which is not the focus of this paper. 
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TABLE 9 
Rail Privatisation Proceeds 
 
Rail Privatisation proceeds  £bn (current prices) £bn (present value)
Railtrack * 
ROSCOs 
Freight 
Infrastructure & Maintenance  cos. 
BR Central Services 
Total 
2.5
1.7
0.3
0.3
0.2
5.0
3.5
2.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
7.0
* Includes £596m of debt.  
Sources: NAO Reports (HC 576, Session 1997/98; HC 25 Session 1998/99); Public 
Enterprise Partnerships Team, HM Treasury. 
 
 
4. Output quality 
 
Whilst privatisation may have resulted in significant efficiency savings, a key question is 
what has happened to output quality. There are four key measures of output quality which 
should be considered: train performance (delays); train crowding; asset condition (broken 
rails; track quality) and safety.  
To date the industry’s performance in these areas has been strongly criticised from 
many directions, particularly in the aftermath of Hatfield – and privatisation, with its 
focus on contractual regimes between disparate industry players, and the need to provide 
a return for shareholders, has often been blamed. However, looking at the pre-Hatfield 
data, it is far from clear that continued government ownership (the counterfactual) would 
have produced better results. Below we look at the four measures in turn. 
 
(a) Train performance 
 
Train performance (delay per passenger train) has improved significantly since 
privatisation (pre-Hatfield – see Figure 6 below). Performance improved sharply in the 
first year after privatisation (due to improvements by Railtrack), but then deteriorated 
steadily over the next three years (due to worsening train operator performance), before 
improving again in 1999/00. Overall, delays per passenger train in 1999/00 were down 
16% compared to 1995/96. The performance regimes which exist between Railtrack and 
the TOCs, and between the TOCs and OPRAF/SRA, provide rewards/penalties for 
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performance above/below target. These regimes have focused management attention on 
the issue of performance.  
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The key question is what would have happened to performance under public 
ownership, given the sharp volume growth we have seen in recent years. Of course, it is 
impossible to know for sure, though we note the absence of performance regimes under 
the old structure. However, we can gain some insight by comparing the changes in train 
performance and volume growth between 1995/96 and 1999/00 (under a privatised 
structure), with a comparable five year period of volume growth during the boom of the 
mid-to-late 1980s (under the old BR structure). 
Table 10 shows that, since privatisation, train performance (measured by punctuality) 
has improved by 2.7%. This improvement was achieved against a background of growth 
in passenger miles and passenger train miles of 28% and 11% respectively over the 
period. During a comparable period in the 1980s (1984/85 to 1988/89)35, which saw 
lower volume growth, performance actually deteriorated (see Table 11). Even if we strip 
out the sharp improvement in performance achieved in the first year of the newly 
privatised structure (1996/97), the deterioration since then only amounts to 0.6%, 
compared to 1%36 during the period of BR control in the mid 1980s – whilst volume 
growth has been much greater. 
                                                 
35 This period saw sharp growth passenger miles, train miles and freight tonne-miles. 1988/89 is taken as 
the cut-off point, as passenger miles started to deteriorate after that date. 
36 Though note that the BR data is not quoted to 1 decimal place.  
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It therefore seems unlikely that train performance would have been better under 
public ownership; indeed, the evidence suggests that it may have been considerably 
worse. 
 
TABLE 10 
Train Performance and Volume: Post-Privatisation 
 
Performance 
 
95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 Change
Punctualitya 
Pass. Train miles (m) 
Pass. Miles (bn) 
89.5% 
231 
18.6 
92.5%
229
19.9
92.5%
237
21.6
91.5%
249
22.6
91.9% 
257 
23.8 
+ 2.7%
+ 11%
+ 28%
(a) Percentage of trains on time. 
Sources: National Rail Trends 2000/01, Q2; Transport Trends, 2001 Edition (DTLR). 
OPRAF Annual Reports (1996/97 to 1999/00). 
 
TABLE 11 
Train Performance and Volume: BR Regime 
 
Performance 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 Change
Punctualitya 
Pass. Train miles (m) 
Pass. Miles (bn) 
90% 
202 
18.5 
89%
201
18.9
90%
203
19.2
90%
213
20.1
89% 
222 
21.3 
(1%)
+ 10%
+ 15%
(a) Percentage of trains on time. 
Sources: BR Annual Reports 1985/86 to 1989/90. Transport Trends, 2001 Edition 
(DTLR). 
 
 
(b) Train overcrowding 
 
Meanwhile, train overcrowding (commuter services) has got worse, with four of the ten 
train operators serving the London market experiencing excessive overcrowding in 
1999/0037. It is clear that overcrowding would also have worsened considerably under 
continued government ownership, given the unprecedented passenger growth we have 
seen (which is assumed to be exogenous in this paper).  
 
(c) Asset condition  
 
The data show that asset condition on the network has deteriorated since privatisation. 
The number of broken rails started to increase in the mid-1990s from a long-run average 
                                                 
37 SRA Annual Report, 1999/00. 
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of between 600 and 700, to 949 in 1999/0038. The Regulator has argued that Railtrack’s 
investment in track maintenance and renewal – though greater than envisaged when the 
company’s charges were set at privatisation – was insufficient, given the level of traffic 
growth. Railtrack inherited a network which had suffered from underinvestment for many 
years. It is therefore unclear whether extra money for investment would have been 
forthcoming under government ownership. The arguments on asset condition are largely 
concerned with capital investment levels, and do not affect our analysis of operating 
costs. 
 
(d) Safety 
 
Finally, concerns over safety have increased since privatisation. However, the data on 
accidents do not show any statistically significant change since privatisation, as noted in 
the Health & Safety Commission “Cullen” report (2001) – written post-Hatfield:  
 
”The statistics do not bear out a picture of a declining safety trend. Professor A W 
Evans, Professor of Transport Safety at the Centre for Transport Studies at University 
College London, had made an extensive statistical analysis of the safety performance 
of the railways before and after privatisation. He concluded that safety performance 
was the same before and after privatisation”.  
 
(e) Overall output quality 
 
To sum up, looking at the data prior to Hatfield the balance of evidence suggests that 
output quality is actually higher under the privatisation scenario. Of course train 
performance has deteriorated sharply since the Hatfield disaster, as Railtrack responded 
by closing large parts of the network. The Regulator has argued that the large-scale 
closure programme was caused by the lack of an adequate asset register (and therefore 
knowledge of the condition of the company’s assets)39. However, the closure programme 
also reflects a lower risk tolerance since privatisation. This reduction has a value, though 
is difficult to quantify. Perhaps BR would not have taken the course adopted by Railtrack, 
but passengers may have faced a higher risk as a result.   
                                                 
38 Track quality also deteriorated from the mid 1990s to 1997, though has been improving since then. 
Sources: HM Rail Inspectorate; Railtrack. 
39 Much of the data on asset condition was transferred from Railtrack to the infrastructure maintenance and 
renewal companies on privatisation. 
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V. Conclusions 
 
In the aftermath of the government’s decision (October 2001) – to place Railtrack into 
administration - attention has focused on what went wrong with privatisation, and how 
crucial network investment will be financed in future. Against this background, our aim 
has been to evaluate the operating cost efficiency gains (or losses) resulting from 
privatisation and restructuring, using a social cost-benefit analysis framework. The actual 
data used in our analysis cover the period to (financial year) 1999/00, and therefore stops 
short of the Hatfield disaster. The next financial year (2000/01), which includes Hatfield, 
is not representative of the period since privatisation as a whole (and not all of the 
financial data are available in any case). We conclude that: 
 
1. Industry outputs have risen sharply since privatisation (1992/93 to 1999/00). 
Passenger train miles, passenger miles and freight tonne miles have grown by 13%, 
21% and 19% respectively. At the same time, the cost base has been reduced by 6% 
in real terms. As a result, unit costs have fallen sharply over the period, by 17% (or 
2.7% per annum). After taking account of scale effects, the rail industry has achieved 
efficiency savings of 13% (or 2% per annum) since privatisation. 
 
2. The post-privatisation performance on efficiency has been significantly better than 
that achieved under public ownership. During the five years prior to privatisation, unit 
costs went up by approximately 1% per annum (after stripping out the impact of scale 
effects). However, for our central scenario, we have assumed counterfactual 
efficiency savings of 1% per annum (based on other UK privatised industries).  
 
3. In the central scenario, privatisation and restructuring has generated efficiency 
savings to date of about £800m, compared to the counterfactual of continued public 
ownership. The savings, achieved over only four years, are more than offset by 
restructuring costs. However, assuming that the savings achieved to date are rolled 
forward into the future (though declining to zero over 15 years as the public sector 
catches up), the total savings rise to £2.5bn under the central scenario (pre-
restructuring), or £1.1bn after restructuring costs. We note that the savings reported 
here are sensitive to the counterfactual cost assumption40.  
                                                 
40 The results are also sensitive to the assumptions concerning the level of fixed costs in the industry, 
though we consider that we have built in sufficient scale economies into our calculation.  
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4. Consumers have benefited considerably from privatisation (£1.2bn) – indeed by more 
than the level of savings. Table 8 shows that, as a result, producers and government 
together lose £100m, with the government losing £300m, whilst producers gain 
£200m. 
 
5. Output quality has improved since privatisation (pre-Hatfield). Train performance has 
improved significantly, whilst the evidence from the 1980s suggests that it would 
have deteriorated under the old BR structure. Although overcrowding has got worse, 
we argue that the same would have happened under public ownership, given the level 
of passenger growth. The increase in the number of broken rails has also resulted 
from increased traffic growth; however, it is unclear whether extra money would have 
been forthcoming to address this issue in the public sector. Finally, despite concerns 
over safety, the Cullen report – written after the Hatfield disaster - found safety 
performance to be (statistically) the same before and after privatisation.  
 
Of course, post-Hatfield, train performance has worsened dramatically. This position 
has resulted partly from the lack of an adequate asset register, which led Railtrack to 
close down large parts of the network. However, it also reflects a reduction in risk 
tolerance since privatisation. Whilst British Rail may not have taken the same action as 
Railtrack, passengers may have been subjected to higher risk as a result. The value of this 
reduced risk is often ignored and is difficult to quantify. 
Looking forward, the Periodic Review (2000) envisaged a significant increase in 
investment in the network, to deliver improved safety systems, and better performance. 
There have also been suggestions that long-term costs may have risen in the aftermath of 
Hatfield. However, these cost increases largely affect capital, not operating costs. 
Furthermore, the Periodic Review also committed Railtrack to deliver significant 
efficiency savings in the coming years.  
The achievement of further efficiencies in the future will be key to delivering the 
government’s objective to improve rail services. This paper finds that a privatised 
structure, where shareholders demand a return on their investment, has led to significant 
improvements in operating efficiency - it remains to be seen whether the new regime, 
with a not-for-profit infrastructure owner, will deliver the same efficiency improvements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 30
APPENDIX A 
CALCULATION OF INDUSTRY COSTS 
 
Costs before privatisation (up to 1992/93) 
 
For the period prior to privatisation, industry operating costs are taken direct from the BR 
accounts: 
 
 The starting point for determining industry costs is BR’s operating costs before 
exceptional items (the latter includes restructuring and severance costs – these are 
included separately in our analysis within R&P costs). 
 
 Depreciation is subtracted, to obtain operating costs before depreciation; 
 
 The amortisation of deferred grant income (ie. the amount of capital grant released 
to the P&L to cover depreciation costs), which appears as a negative cost, is also 
taken out (therefore increasing costs to their true level). 
 
 EU and level crossing grants are added back (again, these appear as negative costs).
 
 Note that Channel Tunnel costs were capitalised, and therefore had no impact on 
operating costs. However the pre-privatisation data do contain some costs in 
respect of Union Railways (planning costs for the high-speed rail link between 
London and the Channel Tunnel). These costs have not been stripped out since we 
expect that similar costs are currently being incurred on large projects (for example, 
WCML) and are being absorbed within operating costs in the post-privatisation 
data. 
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Costs after privatisation (1996/97 onwards) 
 
For the period after privatisation, costs are calculated as follows: 
 
 Total industry profits (pre-depreciation) are subtracted from total final revenue 
from customers/funders. 
 
 Total final revenue is derived by adding the revenues (including subsidy) for all 25 
TOCs, plus the two largest freight operators, EWS and Freightliner. In addition, 
other Railtrack revenue is also added (this is property income, which would have 
previously been received by BR. It also includes a small amount of grant income). 
Open-access revenue (Channel Tunnel and Heathrow Express) is excluded (did not 
exist under BR – and is not included in the volume data used to calculate unit 
costs). 
 
 Industry profits are taken as the sum of TOC, freight operator, ROSCO and 
Railtrack profits. The profit data exclude depreciation and also exceptional items 
(restructuring). As for the BR data, any grants included as negative costs are added 
back.  
 
 As noted in the main report, the profit data do not take account of the profits made 
by the many supplier companies providing services to the industry (particularly the 
infrastructure maintenance and renewal companies). To this extent, post-
privatisation costs are over-estimated, and therefore savings underestimated. 
However, the post-privatisation data exclude the costs of minor freight operators. 
The costs of the Strategic Rail Authority are included. Residual BR costs have not 
been added to the post-privatisation costs (see section III.2 above). 
 
 The Railtrack Asset Maintenance Plan (AMP) charge is treated as depreciation (this 
treatment was formally adopted by the company in 1997/98). 
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APPENDIX B 
COMPARING PRE- AND POST-PRIVATISATION DATA 
 
The following table compares the cost base in 1993/94 with 1994/95, following the 
creation of Railtrack. During this year, it is often reported that the revenue subsidy 
doubled – and this fact is used to discredit the privatisation process. However, the cost 
(before depreciation) increased by only 1.6% in nominal terms (and actually fell in real 
terms). The step change in subsidy in 1994/95 can be explained largely by two factors: 
 
1. in preparation for privatisation, the financial flows were restructured to allow each 
element of the business to earn a commercial return (the government captured these 
returns through sales proceeds); and  
 
2. on its formation in 1994/95, Railtrack introduced a new method of accounting41 for 
maintenance and renewals expenditure, in line with other regulated industries (e.g.. 
BAA and Water Companies) 42.  
 
                                                 
41 Asset Plan Maintenance (AMP). See Railtrack Annual Reports. 
42 See Bradshaw & Lawton-Smith (2000), page 114-115. Previously, BR had accounted for this cost on a 
“pay-as-you-go” basis (and the investment in maintenance and renewal had been insufficient to maintain 
the network in steady-state in the years prior to privatisation).  
 33
Industry Costs  
(£m current prices) 
1993/94 1994/95 
  BR Railtrack Consol. Total
 
Staff costs 
Materials, supplies/services 
Other external charges 
Own work capitaliseda 
Access charges 
Otherb 
Total before depreciation 
 
Depreciation (inc. AMP) 
Amortisation of grant income 
 
Total cost 
 
 
2,493
1,119
-
(253)
-
50
3,409
292
(192)
3,509
2,149
1,157
-
(22)
2169
19
5,472
169
(91)
5,550
287
5
1,215
(61)
-
(46)
1,400
576
-
1,976
 
- 
- 
(1,238) 
- 
(2,169) 
- 
(3,407) 
 
- 
- 
 
(3,407) 
 
2,436
1,162
(23)
(83)
-
(27)
3,465
745
(91)
4,119
 
(a) Includes other operating income 
(b) Includes other adjustments to reflect grants included as negative income, and stripping out of 
privatisation costs within Railtrack. 
 
Sources: British Rail Annual Reports, 1993/94 and 1994/95; Railtrack Annual Report 
1994/95. 
 
 
The table also shows that the increase in cost (and hence subsidy) was driven by a rise in 
depreciation resulting from a change in accounting policy as explained above. Since other 
(non-depreciation) costs remained broadly the same, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the change in accounting policy led to any transfer of costs between operating and capital 
expenditure.  
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APPENDIX C 
KEY ASSUM[PPTIONS OF THE SOCIAL COST BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS  
 
The key assumptions are summarised in this appendix.  
 
 Period to date (to 1999/00) Projections (15 years) 
 Privatisation 
(actual) 
Public ownership 
(counterfactual) 
 
Operating costs See Appendix A 1992/93 cost base 
projected forward based 
on assumptions 
concerning scale effects, 
and three different 
scenarios for underlying 
efficiency gains. 
The efficiency gap 
opened up by the 
privatisation scenario is 
assumed to be closed in 
a linear fashion over the 
next 15 years. 
Restructuring costs All restructuring costs 
included from 1993/94 to 
1999/00 (both costs 
incurred by BR, and 
privatised companies). 
None No further restructuring 
costs assumed in the 
projections. 
Prices Calculated as total TOC 
and Freight operator 
revenue divided by a 
composite volume index, 
based on passenger miles 
and freight tonne-miles. 
Price trends calculated 
from BR revenue and 
volume data are 
extrapolated forward 
from the 1993/94 base 
to 1999/00. 
The price advantage (ie 
lower prices) generated 
by the privatisation 
scenario is assumed to 
be closed in a linear 
fashion over 15 years. 
Subsidies Actual data taken from 
National Rail Trends 
(2000/01, Q2), SRA.  
 
. 
 
 
Assumes that the 
government would pay 
revenue subsidies equal 
to operating losses. Also 
assumes that the 
government would 
continue to cover capital 
costs (see below), at the 
average level over the 5 
years before 
privatisation (£1.1bn per 
annum).  
Actual scenario 
continues at the 1999/00 
level. The counterfactual 
level of revenue 
subsidies gradually 
changes as cost 
efficiencies and price 
reductions feed through 
over 15 years (see 
above). 
Capital costs Ignored in the analysis, except in calculating the 
change in welfare between government and 
producers. Since the counterfactual assumes that the 
government would have continued to invest £1.1bn 
per annum to fund capital costs, we assume that the 
private sector would also need to provide this same 
amount of funding under the privatisation scenario 
(no capital savings assumed). 
Continues at 1999/00 
levels for fifteen years. 
Volumes Actual data taken from 
National Rail Trends 
(2000/01, Q2), SRA. 
 
Volume growth 
assumed to be same as 
for the privatisation 
scenario. 
No further volume 
growth assumed. 
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Company Accounts and Reports 
 
Angel Trains     1996/97 to 1999/00 
British Railways Board   1985/86 to 1995/96  
English, Welsh and Scottish Railways43  1996/97 to 1999/00 
Eversholt     1996/97 to 1998/99 
Porterbrook     1996/97 to 1999/00 
Railtrack      1994/95 to 1999/00 
Train Operating Companies44   1996/97 to 1999/00 
                                                 
43 Note that data for Freightliner taken from the company’s web site (for 1998/99 and 1999/00 only). 
44 As noted in the notes to Table 2, data for some TOCs is not available for 1999/00. 
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